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MONETIZING THE BENEFITS OF RISK AND
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
W. Kip Viscusi *

INTRODUCTION
Should the benefits of risk and environmental regulations be monetized?
For economists, this question is not controversial. Benefits of government
policies have a value given by society’s willingness to pay for these
benefits, which by its very nature poses the valuation issue in monetary
terms. 1 Government agencies have likewise not shied away from
monetizing these benefits.2 A contrary school of thought, however, has
recently emerged, as reflected in the book by Frank Ackerman and Lisa
Heinzerling, Priceless: On Knowing the Price of Everything and the Value
of Nothing. 3 As the title of the book suggests, the authors oppose
economists’ attempts to monetize the value of environmental amenities and
the value of risks to life and health. In this article, I will review the history
of how monetization of benefits came to be the norm for government
policy and explore some of the key economic debates that have arisen.
My point of view is the opposite of that of adherents of the Priceless
approach. Monetizing risk and environmental benefits does not devalue
these outcomes, but rather gives them real economic value when the effects
might otherwise be ignored. Through monetization, policymakers are able
to count these policy consequences fully and in accordance with the values
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1. For a discussion of benefit assessment principles, see policy analysis texts such as
EDITH STOKEY & RICHARD ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 149-51 (1978).
2. See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE
PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 4 (2004) (discussing the EPA’s removal
of lead in gasoline after determining the health benefits of this action in monetary value).
3. See id. at 8. For a general critique of their book, see ROBERT W. HAHN, IN DEFENSE
OF THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF REGULATION (2005).
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attached to these outcomes by the citizens affected by the policy. This is
not to say that there are no controversies that remain once the monetization
approach has been adopted. This Article will explore many of the most
sensitive and problematic concerns, including how we should value risks to
life, whether old people or rich people should be accorded different values
of life, and the proper role of survey methods in benefit valuations. The
existence of such controversies arises because the economic approach
confronts these policy matters directly and incorporates recognition of how
these concerns are valued by the citizenry. In contrast, the Priceless
approach in effect disenfranchises the citizens by abandoning the societal
willingness-to-pay approach to benefits. With no effort to quantify
citizens’ valuations, the policy process will be guided by the subjective
preferences of policymakers.
From an economic standpoint, the advantages of monetizing benefits are
quite strong because establishing this kind of metric makes it much easier
to compare benefits with costs and thus make choices across various policy
alternatives. 4 For example, if we have $10 million to spend, is it more
worthwhile to clean up a hazardous waste site on Long Island, or to reduce
water pollution levels in Wisconsin rivers by ten percent, or to adopt safety
measures that will lead to an average of three fewer schoolchildren being
killed in school bus crashes? Because society’s resources are limited,
ultimately we must be making choices such as these across different policy
domains. To assess which regulatory interventions make sense and which
do not, it is essential to have a scorecard by which it is feasible to make
such comparisons.
Monetization also has an additional practical benefit in a world of
regulatory impact analysis. Costs are quantifiable in dollar terms, as are
many benefit components, so failing to place a monetary value on
seemingly intangible benefits such as environmental amenities may lead to
inadequate attention to intangible benefits in the policy choice process.
Monetizing these benefits puts them on equal footing with benefits that are
perceived to have real economic value because they can be quantified in
dollar terms.
It is useful at the outset to make clear the target of my discussion. From
an economic standpoint, for something to be “priceless” means that it has
an infinite value. Thus, if saving the snail darter is priceless, no amount of
monetary cost should be spared in preserving these fish, even if it depletes
the entire GDP. Because no risk or environmental benefit warrants an

4. See HAHN, supra note 3, at 44 (discussing how scorecards make the regulatory
process more transparent).
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infinite expenditure, the practical policy issue is what level of monetary
cost is justified to obtain the benefit. With costs in dollar terms as our
numeraire, the policy choice has the structure of involving an explicit or
implicit decision that the value of the benefits exceeds that of the costs for
the policy to be worthwhile. Ackerman and Heinzerling oppose this
monetization, as well as the cost-benefit approach, but are not clear on
what operational substitute or policy criterion they favor. However, it is
doubtful that they consider any benefits to be truly “priceless” in the
economic sense. 5
It is useful to start with a bit of background regarding how benefit
assessment became a central focus of the policy evaluation process.
Beginning with the Reagan administration a quarter century ago, regulatory
agencies have been required to assess the costs and benefits of proposed
new regulations. 6 Although the economic principles underlying such
benefit assessments are well-established, the appropriate methodologies for
benefit assessment continue to evolve. 7 Moreover, as the frontiers of the
benefit valuation research are extended, new controversies have arisen with
respect to the appropriate valuation of these benefits.8 The benefits
associated with health, safety, and environmental risk regulations are
particularly controversial because of their distinctive economic
characteristics, such as the fact that one’s life cannot be replaced. 9 Because
these categories of benefits have been the focal point of the “priceless”
debate, this paper examines an economic approach to monetizing health,
safety, and environmental benefits, with a primary focus on the value of
risks to life.
The current regulatory oversight process administered by the U.S. Office
of Management and Budget (OMB) Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (OIRA) is governed by Executive Order 12,866, which was issued
by the Clinton administration and has remained in effect since 1993.10 This
executive order requires that agencies assess regulatory benefits and costs
and suggests that they explore possible monetization of these benefits.11 In
particular, section 1(b)(6) states: “Each agency shall assess both the costs
and the benefits of the intended regulation and, recognizing that some costs
5. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 985 (11th ed. 2003) (defining
“priceless” as “having a value beyond any price”).
6. The Reagan administration executive order was Executive Order 12,291. Exec.
Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 19, 1981).
7. See HAHN, supra note 3, at 1-2.
8. See id.
9. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 2, at 8.
10. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993).
11. Id. at 51,736, 51,741.
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and benefits are difficult to quantify, propose or adopt a regulation only
upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended regulation
justify its costs.” 12
For all major regulatory initiatives, Executive Order 12,866, section
6(a)(C)(ii) requires that agencies undertake the following benefits analysis:
An assessment, including the underlying analysis, of benefits anticipated
from the regulatory action (such as, but not limited to, the promotion of
the efficient functioning of the economy and private markets, the
enhancement of health and safety, the protection of the natural
environment, and the elimination or reduction of discrimination or bias)
together with, to the extent feasible, a quantification of those benefits[.] 13

In theory, government agencies could use a variety of possible metrics to
measure benefits. One could, for example, translate benefits into
equivalent numbers of statistical lives that are saved, river miles for which
the water quality is improved, endangered species that are saved, or some
other metric. The primary currency in which benefits are assessed is
dollars because, ultimately, agencies are required to compare benefits and
costs. From the standpoint of maximizing social welfare, they should
choose those regulations that provide the greatest net benefits to society,
though their legislative mandates are often framed more narrowly. Because
costs are in financial terms, placing benefits in comparable terms would
place them on equal footing and facilitate such comparison. Moreover,
most economic commodities are traded in markets and, as a consequence,
explicit monetary prices are available. 14 As I will indicate below, many
environmental commodities are traded implicitly in markets or have values
that can be elicited through simulated market experiments, and, as a result,
it is feasible to attach dollar values to many seemingly unquantifiable
benefits. 15
The OMB has continued to emphasize the importance of monetizing
benefits in the various reports it has issued in its efforts to outline the
analytical underpinnings of regulatory impact assessment. In its 2003
OMB Circular A-4, OIRA reiterated the importance of quantifying
benefits. Its outline of the key elements of regulatory analysis included the
following comment:

12. Id. at 51,736.
13. Id. at 51,741.
14. The central role of prices in markets is discussed in many textbooks, such as N.
GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 9 (4th ed. 2006).
15. The use of surveys and market experiments to derive implicit values of life are
discussed in W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Risks to Life and Health, 31 J. ECON. LITERATURE
1912 (1993) [hereinafter Viscusi, Value of Risks].
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With this information, you should be able to assess quantitatively the
benefits and costs of the proposed rule and its alternatives. A complete
regulatory analysis includes a discussion of non-quantified as well as
quantified benefits and costs. A non-quantified outcome is a benefit or
cost that has not been quantified or monetized in the analysis. 16

OMB expands on these requirements by emphasizing the importance of
monetizing benefits from the standpoint of establishing comparability with
costs: “A distinctive feature of BCA [Benefit-Cost Analysis] is that both
benefits and costs are expressed in monetary units, which allows you to
evaluate different regulatory options with a variety of attributes using a
common measure.” 17
Even though monetization of benefits has become a standard operating
procedure as part of regulatory policy assessment, there nevertheless are
legitimate economic controversies that remain. The remainder of the
Article explores some of the ongoing debates within the economics
community as well as the more salient critiques that non-economists have
offered.
The Value of Statistical Life Concept
Many might view it as immoral to place a value on human life. That
task is fortunately not before us. What we face is the closely-related task of
valuing the reduction of small risks to life. How much is society willing to
pay to reduce the risk of cancer from hazardous waste exposures by one
chance in 10,000 for a person exposed to the risk over a thirty-year period?
Structuring our approach to answer questions such as these is
straightforward based on the fundamental guidelines for benefit
assessment. The governing principle for benefit assessment generally, as
well as for benefit assessment for regulatory policies, is the value of the
benefit in terms of society’s willingness to pay for these benefits.18

16. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4, REGULATORY ANALYSIS 3 (Sept. 17,
A-4],
available
at
2003)
[hereinafter
OMB,
CIRCULAR
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a004/a-4.pdf.
17. Id. at 10.
18. CIRCULAR A-4 makes the following observation:
“Opportunity cost” is the appropriate concept for valuing both benefits and costs.
The principle of “willingness-to-pay” (WTP) captures the notion of opportunity
cost by measuring what individuals are willing to forgo to enjoy a particular
benefit. In general, economists tend to view WTP as the most appropriate
measure of opportunity cost, but an individual’s “willingness-to-accept” (WTA)
compensation for not receiving the improvement can also provide a valid measure
of opportunity cost.
Id. at 18.
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Applying this concept to health, safety, and environmental regulations, the
appropriate benefit value is society’s willingness to pay for the risk
reduction or environmental improvement that will result from the policy.
The methodology that equates benefits with society’s willingness to pay for
the change in policy outcomes by its very nature is conceptually closely
linked to potential monetization of benefits.
What benefit outcome being valued depends on the policy context. For
some environmental policies, the benefit outcome is quite concrete. As a
result of a policy preventing pollution near national parks, visibility in
those areas will improve. 19 In most instances of health, safety, and
environmental regulations that I have seen, the benefit is defined in terms
of a distribution of possible outcomes. Thus, if a regulation by the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) or the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) will lead to benefits in terms of
ten reduced expected cancer deaths per year, then the benefit outcome to be
valued is the number of statistical lives that are saved, which for this
example is ten. We do not know in advance which particular people will
be saved by the regulation, nor do we know that exactly ten people will be
saved every year. It could be more or less than ten, but our best estimate
based on the dose-response relationship for the chemicals being reduced
and the levels of exposures for these chemicals is that the mean value of the
distribution of the number of lives that will be saved is ten.
This willingness-to-pay principle links up quite directly with
economists’ approach to valuing risks to life and health, but not to fatality
valuation methodologies used for other purposes, such as compensation for
victims of wrongful death. 20 The early studies on the value of life equated
the value of people’s lives to the present value of their lost earnings, as in
the case of court awards for personal injury. 21 This approach has the
advantage of being a magnitude that is easy to calculate. 22 All one needs is
an estimate of individual earnings at different points in time, a measure of
19. See generally William D. Schulze et al., The Economic Benefits of Preserving
Visibility in the National Parklands of the Southwest, 23 NAT. RESOURCES J. 149 (1983); see
also LAURAINE G. CHESTNUT & ROBERT D. ROWE, PRESERVATION VALUES FOR VISIBILITY
PROTECTION
AT
THE
NATIONAL
PARKS,
http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eerm.nsf/Geographic%20Area!OpenView&Start=117
(follow “Yosemite National Park” hyperlink; then follow “Preservation Values for Visibility
Protection at the National Parks (02/16/1990)” hyperlink).
20. These different approaches are contrasted in W. Kip Viscusi, Misuses and Proper
Uses of Hedonic Values of Life in Legal Contexts, 13 J. FORENSIC ECON. 111 (2000)
[hereinafter Viscusi, Misuses and Proper Uses].
21. Dorothy P. Rice & Barbara S. Cooper, The Economic Value of Life, 57 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH & NATION’S HEALTH 1954, 1954-66 (1967).
22. See id.
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work-life expectancy, and a rate of discount used to convert future earnings
losses into present dollar terms. 23 This approach to valuing life is
appropriate for court cases in which compensation is paid to the surviving
family members for a fatal accident and to the accident victim in the case
of nonfatal accidents. 24 In some instances, these present value of lost
earnings calculations are also reduced by the taxes or the consumption
value that the deceased would have had, where these rules differ by
jurisdiction. 25
It is noteworthy that these present-value calculations will have quite
strong distributional consequences. The simple mathematics is that if one’s
annual earnings are doubled, then the present value of one’s lost earnings
doubles as well. Thus, court awards will be proportional to income levels,
leading more affluent accident victims to receive higher levels of
compensation than less affluent victims. There is an underlying rationale
for these differences and for the use of present value of lost earnings more
generally to the extent that the function of such awards is to serve as
insurance. 26 People with higher income have suffered a greater income
loss than those with a lower income, so that to maintain their current
economic standard, higher levels of compensation are needed. 27 This line
of analysis is quite compelling in the case of monetary losses, but in the
case of irreplaceable health effects, it is not obvious that a disabled person
with an annual income of $100,000 should receive twice the level of
compensation as a disabled person with an annual income of $50,000.28
Thus, the court-awarded compensation amounts are not immune from
potential controversy with respect to their distributional consequences.
Although the present value of lost earnings approach is often pertinent
for insuring the income losses of accident victims, it is not linked to the
guiding principle for benefit assessment, which is society’s willingness to
pay for the benefit.29 In the case of a small risk of death, such as one in
23. See id. at 1955-56.
24. See generally ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF INJURY AND DEATH DAMAGES (Roger T.
Kaufman et al. eds., 2005).
25. See STUART M. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH: ECONOMIC HANDBOOK
2, 39 (2d ed. 1979); W. Cris Lewis & Tyler J. Bowles, Alternative Approaches to Tax
Adjustments in Appraising Economic Loss, J. LEGAL ECON., Spring/Summer 1996, at 27.
26. Viscusi, Misuses and Proper Uses, supra note 20, at 117.
27. If the monetary loss is higher, the “make whole” amount will be greater. See id.
(explaining the “make whole” concept).
28. W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Life in Legal Contexts: Survey and Critique, 2 AM. L.
& ECON. REV. 195, 195-222 (2000), reprinted in ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT:
SELECTED READINGS (Robert N. Stavins ed., 5th ed. 2005) [hereinafter Viscusi, Legal
Contexts].
29. STOKEY & ZECKHAUSER, supra note 1, at 149-51.
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100,000, a person with a lifetime income with a present value of $700,000
might well be willing to pay more than seven dollars to eliminate this risk,
even though seven dollars represents 1/100,000 of his or her lifetime
wealth. The appropriate matter of concern is the amount of money that the
person is willing to pay to reduce the small probability of death, or the riskmoney tradeoff, and this amount is not limited to the fatality risk value
multiplied by one’s lifetime wealth. 30 Such a constraint is binding for the
certainty of death, but not for very small risks.
Consider the following example that illustrates the fundamentals of the
value of statistical life (“VSL”) concept. Suppose that you are in a group
of 100,000 people, and that one of you will die with certainty. The risk of
death is a random event that affects all people equally. How much would
you be willing to pay to eliminate this risk? Suppose the answer is $70 for
each person in the group. What this value implies is that collectively, the
group of 100,000 people would be willing to spend $7 million to eliminate
the risk of one statistical death to their group. Put in somewhat different
terms, the willingness-to-pay value of seventy dollars divided by the risk
reduction of one chance in 100,000 also equals $7 million. Because we are
dealing with the willingness to pay to reduce small probabilities of death,
the $7 million value for statistical life need not be constrained by the
present value of the person’s earnings. The individual is not buying out of
the risk of certain death, but rather is simply purchasing a minor reduction
in the risk of death. The value of statistical life that would be pertinent for
much greater risk reductions would, of course, be potentially different, but
the amount of risk reduction associated with government regulatory
policies is typically quite low.
Estimating the Value of Statistical Life
There are two principal approaches that can be used to derive the value
of the risk-money tradeoff that people have for fatality risks: survey
approaches or statistical estimates of values implied by actual risk taking
decisions. 31 One could run a survey asking people their willingness to pay
for a risk reduction. Such contingent valuation or stated preference surveys
present respondents with a hypothetical fatality risk situation and ask how
much they would pay for a particular risk reduction. 32 A considerable
literature has outlined requirements that such studies should meet to be

30. Viscusi, Misuses and Proper Uses, supra note 20, at 115.
31. See Viscusi, Value of Risks, supra note 15, at 1926-27 (for labor market estimates);
id. at 1940 (for survey evidence).
32. Id. at 1939.
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reliable, such as providing a credible scenario and payment mechanism to
As discussed below, OMB has also detailed the
respondents. 33
requirements that stated preference studies should meet. 34 Ultimately,
however, stated preferences are not real decisions. 35 To the extent that we
can elicit values of statistical life based on actual choices that people make,
then it is likely that these decisions will provide more reliable evidence of
people’s valuation of real risks than would surveys’ valuations of
hypothetical risks. 36 Nevertheless, well-designed surveys often play a quite
valuable role in deriving values for environmental commodities and health
outcomes for which good market data are not readily available.37
The dominant source of evidence regarding VSL is derived from market
data. 38 Although risks to life are not treated explicitly in markets, they are
often bundled with other commodities that are in fact traded.39 Workers on
hazardous jobs will receive compensating wage differentials for jobs that
pose additional risk. This theoretical approach, which was introduced by
Adam Smith, pertains to other markets as well. 40 Product market prices
will be lower for risky products, and housing prices will be lower for
houses in more dangerous neighborhoods.
It is worth noting at the outset that analyses of these various risk-money
tradeoffs differ somewhat in the risk tradeoff they are measuring. The
labor market wage premium for fatality risks is a willingness to accept
(“WTA”) measure. 41 How much must the worker get paid to be willing to
incur a greater risk? In contrast, for risky products and risky houses, the
measure is a willingness to pay (“WTP”) measure, in that a person would
be paying a higher price for the product or the house for a higher safety
level. 42 For very small changes in risk, the WTA and WTP measures of the

33. W. KIP VISCUSI, JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON, JR. & JOHN M. VERNON, ECONOMICS OF
REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 780-81 (4th ed. 2005) [hereinafter VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS
OF REGULATION].
34. In particular, see OMB, CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 16, at 23.
35. Id. at 24 (“[Y]ou should prefer revealed preference data over stated preference data
because revealed preference data are based on actual decisions, where market participants
enjoy or suffer the consequences of their decisions.”).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 22.
38. See W. Kip Viscusi & Joseph E. Aldy, The Value of a Statistical Life: A Critical
Review of Market Estimates Throughout the World, 27 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5, 6 (2003)
[hereinafter Viscusi & Aldy, Statistical Life].
39. Viscusi, Value of Risks, supra note 15, at 1913-14.
40. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 115-17 (R.H. Campbell et al. eds., 1976) (1776).
41. See Viscusi, Value of Risks, supra note 15, at 1918 n.16.
42. Id.
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risk-money tradeoff should be the same, from an economic standpoint. 43
However, in experimental contexts, often there is a considerable difference
in these values, as the WTA often greatly exceeds the WTP value.44
There have been dozens of studies of VSL using labor market data from
the United States as well as throughout the world. The general approach
researchers have used is to formulate a regression analysis model in which
the worker’s wage rate is a function of a variety of demographic
characteristics and job characteristics, including the fatality rate for the
worker’s occupation and industry. 45 Based on a comprehensive survey of
such studies in the United States, Viscusi and Aldy found that in year 2000
U.S. dollars, the median value of statistical life was $6.7 million.46 If a
typical worker in the United States faces an on-the-job fatality risk of one
chance in 25,000, a $6.7 million value of life implies that that worker
receives an extra $268 per year in compensation for the additional risk.47
As one would expect, the estimates of VSL are lower in less affluent
countries, such as South Korea, India, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. 48
To what extent should we view wage-risk tradeoffs implied by small
risks as being reliable? While the fatality risks are now on the order of
1/25,000 annually, in earlier studies the U.S. workplace was more
dangerous, with risks on the order of 1/10,000. 49 The actual precision of
such estimates should not be a matter for idle speculation. From a
statistical standpoint, all such estimates have an associated estimated error,
and it is feasible to construct pertinent confidence intervals around these
values. 50
The estimates are reasonably robust and have remained quite stable over
time, controlling for inflation. 51 Similarly, VSL estimates based on labor
market studies, product market studies, and housing market purchases all

43. Id. (describing survey and results).
44. For an example of extreme difference of this type, see W. Kip Viscusi, Wesley A.
Magat & Joel Huber, An Investigation of the Rationality of Consumer Valuations of Multiple
Health Risks, 18 RAND J. ECON. 465 (1987).
45. W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK
34-41 (1992) [hereinafter VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS].
46. See Viscusi & Aldy, Statistical Life, supra note 38, at 63 tbl.A.
47. Multiplying 1/25,000 and $6.7 million equals $268. For similar examples, see
VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION, supra note 33, at 719.
48. Viscusi & Aldy, Statistical Life, supra note 38, at 36.
49. Viscusi, Value of Risks, supra note 15, at 1913.
50. For an example of such confidence intervals see Richard Thaler & Sherwin Rosen,
The Value of Saving a Life: Evidence from the Labor Market, in HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION
AND CONSUMPTION 265, 294 (Nestor R. Terleckyj ed., 1976).
51. Viscusi & Aldy, Statistical Life, supra note 38, at 18-21.
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yield similar answers. 52 Survey studies that specifically elicit WTP values
for reductions in risk likewise generate estimates in the same range.53
Thus, while the various estimates do not resolve whether VSL is $6
million, $8 million, or $10 million, we can be quite confident that wildly
different VSL numbers are not appropriate.
Heterogeneity and VSL
The variables that affect differences in VSL accord with many of one’s
expectations. A principal implication of the Viscusi and Aldy 2003 metaanalysis pertains to the income elasticity of VSL. 54 In particular, they
found that this income elasticity was in the range of 0.5 to 0.6, or put
somewhat differently, a ten percent increase in one’s income will raise the
value of one’s statistical life by five percent to six percent. 55 The
responsiveness of the VSL to income levels is positive, as one would
expect. 56
This positive income elasticity is consistent with other economic
behaviors, given the positive relationship of a variety of health and safety
expenditures with respect to individual income. 57 Note, however, that the
percentage change in the VSL with respect to a percentage increase in
income is less than proportional. 58 In contrast, the present value of lost
earnings measure is strictly proportional to one’s income. The role of
income elasticity will be quite central to subsequent discussions of
appropriate recognition of distributional considerations pertaining to VSL.
Contrary to the claims by Ackerman and Heinzerling, the VSL
methodology does not assume that all deaths are equally unattractive.59
For example, one would expect people to have a different value for death
resulting from cancer as opposed to an accidental death on the job.
Because market data are not well suited to making these distinctions, the
emphasis instead has been on stated preference approaches in which people
reveal their automobile death risk equivalent for a risk of cancer.60 We
52. Id. at 19-21, 25 (tables of survey results).
53. VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS, supra note 45, at 73.
54. Viscusi & Aldy, Statistical Life, supra note 38, at 36-43.
55. Id. at 37.
56. Id.
57. See generally William N. Evans & W. Kip Viscusi, Income Effects and the Value of
Health, 28 J. HUM. RESOURCES 497, 497-518 (1993) (exploring the effect of income on
willingness to pay for safer products to affect health).
58. Viscusi & Aldy, Statistical Life, supra note 38, at 37, 40 tbl.7.
59. Some confusion along these lines is exhibited in the discussion by Frank Ackerman
and Lisa Heinzerling in ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 2, at 70.
60. See generally Wesley A. Magat, W. Kip Viscusi & Joel Huber, A Reference Lottery
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have developed such estimates for both fatal and nonfatal cases of cancer.
There have also been exploratory survey analyses of attitudes toward
different types of deaths using a student convenience sample. 61
Another possible approach to capturing differences in the quantity and
quality of life is the quality-adjusted life years (“QALY”) methodology.
This methodology seeks to take into account both the amount of life left as
well as the quality of these life years, usually using some kind of stated
preference format. 62 The QALY approach may also entail the use of thirdparty experts rather than eliciting values of those actually affected by a
policy. 63 Although recognizing these two different aspects of longevity
makes sense conceptually, the QALY methodology is not sound from an
economic standpoint. 64 For example, based on the QALY methodology, a
twenty percent reduction in one’s lifespan would have the same value if
one had five remaining years of life or fifty remaining years of life.65
Although $7 million is a consensus estimate for VSL based on labor
market studies, the value of a statistical life is not a natural constant. 66 It
may differ across time and across individuals. 67 The VSL number simply
represents the tradeoff people have exhibited between risk and money. 68
People may have quite different preferences regarding the balance they
wish to strike, just as they do for other economic commodities. Because of
this heterogeneity, different samples of workers with a different mix of job
risks and occupations often generate estimates of VSL that differ.
On a theoretical basis, one should be consistent and strike the same
fatality risk-cost tradeoff across all domains of one’s decisions, assuming
that there are continuous risky choices available. Some decisions are, of
course, lumpy in that you either choose to wear a ski helmet or not to wear
a ski helmet. It is interesting, however, that the wide range of estimates of
VSL from the product and housing market often yield similar estimates to
those found in the labor market, despite the mix of individuals making the

Metric for Valuing Health, 42 MGMT. SCI. 1118 (1996).
61. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Bad Deaths, 14 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 259 (1997).
62. See John M. Miyamoto et al., The Zero Condition: A Simplifying Assumption in
QALY Measurement and Multiattribute Utility, 44 MGMT. SCI. 839 (1998).
63. Studies of medical decisions sometimes use patient populations, while other studies
use health professionals. See Patrick Hofstetter & James K. Hammitt, Selecting Human
Health Metrics for Environmental Decision-Support Tools, 22 RISK ANALYSIS 965, 971-72
(2002).
64. OMB, CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 16, at 13.
65. For this critique and related comments on the QALY approach, see id.
66. See Viscusi, Legal Contexts, supra note 28, at 205-08 (discussing VSL).
67. See id.
68. Id.
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choices being different and the frequent lumpiness of the decisions that are
available in these contexts.69
The implied VSL revealed by personal decisions is in the range of $3.8
million to $5.4 million for the purchase of used cars, $5.13 million based
on a study of the purchase of new cars, at least $1 million based on seatbelt
usage decisions, from $4.3 to $5 million based on housing price responses
to the presence of hazardous waste sites, and at least $2.1 to $4.3 million
based on the purchase of bike helmets. 70 Similarly, survey studies yield
expressed willingness-to-pay values that are in the single-digit million
dollar range. 71
A particularly interesting manifestation of heterogeneous attitude toward
risks is that of smokers. Smoking is by far the greatest health risk that
millions of consumers take. 72 To the extent that people are making
consistent risk-taking decisions across different domains, one would also
expect smokers to exhibit different and substantially lower risk-money
tradeoffs than nonsmokers. 73 Compared to nonsmokers, smokers are ten
percent less likely to wear their seatbelts, five percent less likely to check
their blood pressure, two times more likely to have a home accident, and
are nine percent less likely to floss their teeth. 74 Smokers also work on
riskier jobs in terms of the average annual injury risk associated with the
job. 75 Moreover, controlling for the riskiness of the job, smokers are more
likely to be injured.76 In terms of the value of statistical injury, which is
the nonfatal risk analog of VSL, smokers exhibit an implicit value of
$20,000 per statistical injury as compared to $39,000 for nonsmokers. 77 A
sometimes difficult question for policy analysis is the extent to which
personal differences in risk preferences such as these should be reflected in
policy evaluations.
In his commentary on my conference presentation of this paper, Adam
Scales raised the interesting issue of differences in VSL by gender and

69. See Viscusi & Aldy, Statistical Life, supra note 38, at 24-25.
70. See id. at 25.
71. The U.S. surveys reported in Viscusi, Value of Risks, supra note 15, at 1940, are all
in the single-digit range.
72. W. KIP VISCUSI, SMOKE-FILLED ROOMS: A POSTMORTEM ON THE TOBACCO DEAL 1
(2002) [hereinafter VISCUSI, SMOKE-FILLED ROOMS].
73. Most of the evidence here comparing smokers to nonsmokers is drawn from W. Kip
Viscusi & Joni Hersch, Cigarette Smokers as Job Risk Takers, 83 REV. ECON. & STAT. 269,
269 (2001); see generally VISCUSI, SMOKE-FILLED ROOMS, supra note 72.
74. VISCUSI, SMOKE-FILLED ROOMS, supra note 72, at 169.
75. See Viscusi & Hersch, supra note 73, at 274.
76. See id.
77. Id. at 276.
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race. 78 Consider first the case of labor market evidence on risk premiums
for women. 79 The compensating differential for risk question is twofold.
First, do women work at risky jobs for which one would expect there to be
a premium for the hazards posed by the job? Second, is there evidence that
in fact women do get paid more for jobs that pose additional health and
safety risks? Empirical analysis of gender-specific differences in risk
levels indicates that women do work in jobs that often pose injury risks, but
on average these jobs are safer than men’s jobs. 80 Given that women face
job risks, the labor market premiums for risk function in much the same
way for women as for men. Just as men receive compensating wage
differentials for the job risks they face, female employees do as well.81
The more interesting demographic differences are with respect to race.
In a recent article, I examined racial differences in fatality risk premiums,
which in turn can be used to calculate how VSL levels vary by race.82
Black workers exhibited VSL levels that were below those of White
workers. 83 The more interesting aspect of the analysis was the exploration
of the cause of these VSL differences. These racial differences were not
solely attributable to differences in workers’ attitudes toward risk, but
rather, they could be traced to differences in market opportunities.84 White
workers are choosing jobs from a different set of wage-risk combinations
that is not available to Black workers. 85 Insofar as the differences in VSL
are a consequence of less attractive job options that are possibly the result
of discriminatory effects, Black workers do not necessarily indicate a
greater willingness to bear risk. 86 An important caveat that should pertain
to any attempt to recognize heterogeneity in VSL levels is that VSL studies
of observed market risk tradeoffs reflect the influence of both market
opportunities and preferences of those bearing the risk. 87 Consequently,
one should be cautious in attributing observed differences to risk

78. Adam Scales, Professor, Wash. & Lee Univ. Sch. of Law, Remarks at the Fordham
Urban Law Journal Symposium: The Contemporary Regulatory State (Feb. 23, 2006).
79. See generally Joni Hersch, Compensating Differentials for Gender-Specific Job
Injury Risks, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 598 (1998).
80. Id. at 606.
81. See id. at 598. Note that this study examined injury rates and did not consider VSLs
by gender.
82. See generally W. Kip Viscusi, Racial Differences in Labor Market Values of a
Statistical Life, 27 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 239 (2003).
83. Id. at 242.
84. Id. at 240.
85. Id. at 240-43.
86. Id. at 243.
87. Id.
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preferences. 88
Valuing Expected Lives Saved for Policy Analysis
The watershed event that led to the use of the value-of-life methodology
for regulatory benefit assessment was the 1982 debate between OSHA and
OMB over the proposed new hazard communication regulation.89 OSHA
prepared a regulatory impact analysis of this costly regulatory proposal,
which for the first time would have required the labeling of dangerous
chemicals in the workplace. 90 Because, in OSHA’s view, life was too
sacred to value, instead the agency calculated the cost of death for the
workers whose lives would be saved by the proposed regulation. 91 Using
the present value of the workers’ lost earnings and medical costs as a
measure of the benefits value led to a relatively low benefit assessment and
a subsequent OMB challenge to the regulation.92 OSHA then appealed
OIRA’s rejection of the regulation to then-Vice President Bush. 93 I was
asked by both parties to settle the dispute between the two agencies over
the regulatory analysis. By using my labor market estimates of the value of
life as well as the implicit value of nonfatal injuries, I was able to show that
benefits were approximately an order of magnitude greater than what
OSHA had estimated. 94 The result was that benefits exceeded costs based
on a proper assessment of these health and safety benefits.95 The day after
my report in favor of the regulation reached the Reagan White House, the
regulation was issued. 96
Since that time, there has been widespread adoption of the VSL
approach throughout the federal government. 97 The methodology offers
the advantage of being based on sound economic theory and empirical
work, and has the practical benefit for regulatory agencies of making their
regulations look much more attractive than they otherwise would had they
continued to rely on the present value of lost earnings approach.98
88. Id.
89. For a general description of this debate and of my role in it, see Pete Earley, What’s
a Life Worth?, WASH. POST MAG., June 9, 1985, at 11; see also VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS,
supra note 45.
90. Earley, supra note 89, at 11-13.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS, supra note 45, at 261-63.
94. See id. at 262-63.
95. Id. at 263.
96. Earley, supra note 89, at 13.
97. HAHN, supra note 3, at 24.
98. Id. at 35.
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Armed with this methodology, do we then have a basis for approaching
policy decisions involving identified lives, such as a girl trapped in a well
or a coal miner trapped underground? Should we apply the current VSL
number of $7 million and save them only if the cost of doing so is below
that amount? In these instances, the policy is not saving statistical lives but
identified lives. Society’s willingness to pay to reduce the risk of death for
identified victims from a one-hundred percent chance of death to the
certainty of life may be quite different than our attitude toward reducing
statistical deaths arising from very small probabilities.
The identified girl in a well or trapped coal miner also have the
advantage of substantial publicity that will evoke altruistic concerns.99
Indeed, this altruism is often so great that the special status accorded to
identified lives is not restricted to people; as a society we also have a
review of the willingness to spend substantial sums to try to save the lives
of beached whales. Saving these identified lives also tends to be a
relatively infrequent event, which may affect the extent of society’s broader
altruistic interests. Our willingness to pay to save identified lives may be
reduced if we confronted as an identified life the possibility of saving the
lives of each of the 44,600 people killed each year in motor-vehicle
accidents. 100 The deaths of over 100 identified lives per day would surely
generate less public attention per death than the rarer calamities that lead to
trapped coal miners or sailors lost at sea.
Age and the Senior Discount
One of the most controversial contexts in which the heterogeneity of
attitudes toward risk has surfaced has pertained to whether the lives of
older people should be given a lower benefit value than for the young. This
general topic has come under the heading of a “death discount,” “senior
death discount,” and “senior discount.”101 The policy context in which this
debate arose was the EPA analysis of the Clear Skies Initiative, in which it
applied a thirty-seven percent discount to the VSL benefit figure for those
who are age sixty-five and older. 102 The reason for the controversy was
99. VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS, supra note 45, at 21.
100. The motor vehicle accident death toll is for 2004, from NAT’L SAFETY COUNCIL,
TRAFFIC
SAFETY
STATISTICS
3
(2005),
available
at
http://www.nsc.org/issues/driving/TrafficSafetyApr2005.pdf.
101. See among the following journalistic accounts of this debate John J. Fialka, EPA to
Stop “Death Discount” to Value New Regulations, WALL ST. J., May 8, 2003, at D3;
Katharine Q. Seelye & John Tierney, E.P.A. Drops Age-Based Cost Studies, N.Y. TIMES,
May 8, 2003, at A34; Cindy Skrzycki, Under Fire: EPA Drops the “Senior Death
Discount,” WASH. POST, May 13, 2003, at E1.
102. The thirty-seven percent senior discount figure is from U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
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twofold. First, there was the clearly sensitive issue of whether the lives of
the elderly should be valued less than the lives of those younger than age
sixty-five. 103 Second, because the lion’s share of the benefits of the Clear
Skies Initiative are for reducing fatalities among those aged sixty-five and
over, the application of a senior discount has a nontrivial effect on the
assessed benefits. 104 In terms of the long-term exposure analysis, the
reduced annual fatalities in the year 2010 would be 1,900 for those eighteen
to sixty-four and 6,000 for those aged sixty-five and over. 105 Application
of this senior adjustment increases the undiscounted benefits in that year
from $48.2 billion to $48.7 billion. 106
Much of the confusion around the senior discount debate could have
been avoided had the policy debate focused on first principles. Are the
lives of senior citizens worth less, and whose values count in such an
assessment? The key question is whether the willingness to pay to reduce
fatality risks declines with age and, if so, by how much? If all of us lived
forever then there would be a quite legitimate concern about differentiating
the VSL benefit value according to age. However, with a finite lifespan,
the reduced risk to life will save a different amount of the commodity based
on one’s remaining life expectancy. One’s willingness to pay to reduce a
fatality risk is likely to vary with the amount of the remaining life, as sixty
remaining life years is a larger commodity than a month or two of
remaining life for individuals suffering from advanced respiratory failure.
Treating the VSL differentially based on age may seem to some to be
inequitable in that the lives of people are being valued differently. 107 By
the same token, one could claim that it is inequitable to value the risks to
life for those who have a very short life expectancy at the same value as
those who have a very long life expectancy, because doing so places a
much higher premium per year of life saved for the old than for the

TECHNICAL ADDENDUM: METHODOLOGIES FOR THE BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF THE CLEAR SKIES
INITIATIVE 35-37 (2002) (noting a VSL of $3.7 million for those under age sixty-five and a
VSL of $2.3 million for those sixty-five and older, a thirty-seven percent discount),
available at http://www.epa.gov/air/clearskies/tech_adden.pdf.
The reduced annual
fatalities figures for the regulation are from U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, TECHNICAL
ADDENDUM: METHODOLOGIES FOR THE BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF THE CLEAR SKIES ACT OF 2003,
at 64 (2003) [hereinafter EPA, TECHNICAL ADDENDUM 2003], available at
http://www.epa.gov/air/clearskies/tech_addendum.pdf.
103. Skrzycki, supra note 101, at E1.
104. See W. KIP VISCUSI & JOSEPH E. ALDY, LABOR MARKET ESTIMATES OF THE SENIOR
DISCOUNT FOR THE VALUE OF STATISTICAL LIFE 1 (2006) [hereinafter VISCUSI & ALDY,
LABOR MARKET ESTIMATES], available at http://www.rff.org/documents/RFF-DP-06-12.pdf.
105. EPA, TECHNICAL ADDENDUM 2003, supra note 102, at 64.
106. VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION, supra note 33, at 782.
107. See Seelye & Tierney, supra note 101, at A34.
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young. 108 In the absence of empirical evidence, one can divide the
estimated VSL of $7 million by the average remaining lifetime or
discounted expected remaining years of life for those workers to calculate a
value per life year. Doing so implicitly assumes that each life year is
equally attractive.
A sounder basis for determining the appropriate benefit value is not to
make appeals to one of these two equity considerations, or to speculate on
how the willingness to pay to reduce risks actually varies with age. One
possibility is to use labor market estimates of how the VSL varies with
age. 109 Early studies in this vein imposed empirical constraints on the
VSL-age relationship that did not permit the relationship to be flexible,
with the result that they estimated VSL to be a decreasing function of the
worker’s age. 110 More recent studies have made more refined attempts to
explore the age variations in VSL. A recent paper by Viscusi and Aldy has
used age-specific fatality rates to explore how labor market premiums for
fatality risks vary with worker age. 111 Although the VSL does display an
inverted U-shaped relationship with respect to individual age, for the oldest
worker group examined, those who were aged fifty-five to sixty-two, the
VSL remains substantial and is on the order of $6 million. 112
Another study of labor market variations in VSL with respect to age by
Kniesner, Viscusi, and Ziliak has focused on how recognizing the life-cycle
pattern of consumption affects one’s age-adjusted estimates of VSL. 113
Individual affluence rises over time, as does individual consumption, with
the peak value occurring around age fifty. 114 This relationship in turn
influences the life-cycle pattern of VSL. 115 While the VSL does in fact
display an inverted U-shaped pattern, the pattern for older age groups is
relatively flat. 116 Their estimates of the VSL for the oldest age group that
they studied, those fifty-seven to sixty-five, indicated that using ageadjusted estimates of the VSL may actually increase estimated benefits

108. See id.
109. See Viscusi & Aldy, Statistical Life, supra note 38, at 7; see generally VISCUSI &
ALDY, LABOR MARKET ESTIMATES, supra note 104.
110. For a review of these studies, see Viscusi & Aldy, Statistical Life, supra note 38, at
50.
111. See generally VISCUSI & ALDY, LABOR MARKET ESTIMATES, supra note 104.
112. Id. at 12-13.
113. See generally Thomas J. Kniesner, W. Kip Viscusi & James P. Ziliak, Life-Cycle
Consumption and the Age-Adjusted Value of Life, 5 CONTRIBUTIONS TO ECON. ANALYSIS &
POL’Y 1 (2006).
114. Id. at 2, 26-27.
115. See generally id.
116. Id. at 26.
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rather than decrease them, if the estimates for fifty-seven to sixty-five year
olds are reflective of the VSL for those over age sixty-five. 117
What these studies suggest is that arbitrary reductions in VSL for
different groups in society should be based on empirical evidence rather
than on conjectures about how these values differ across society. In this
instance, the role of age is quite complex, given that one’s resources and
attitudes toward risk change over time, just as does one’s remaining life
expectancy. Overall, willingness to pay to reduce risks of death does not
decline proportionally with one’s expected remaining lifetime. 118
Notwithstanding the lack of strong evidence for a substantial senior
discount, there still remains the practical task of how to value different
lifespans. Suppose an air pollution regulation will extend the lives of those
with advanced respiratory disease by only two months? Surely, a VSL of
$7 million is too high. Developing meaningful estimates for such a
population’s willingness to pay for reduced risks to life remains an open
challenge, as does the development of meaningful VSL levels for children.
Should Income Levels Matter?
The operative benefit principle is society’s willingness to pay, which in
turn is intrinsically linked to people’s ability to pay. Are we troubled by
the fact that poor people have a different risk-cost tradeoff than do the more
affluent? It is for good reason that the appropriate benefit measure is
linked to people’s willingness to pay, in that this willingness-to-pay
measure is a reflection of their actual preferences.119 Engaging in thought
experiments about what regulations poor people would prefer if they had
the same income as Bill Gates or that of a government official making over
$100,000 per year will, of course, lead us to different policy choices, but
these will not be choices that enhance the welfare of the poor as they
perceive it. It is likely that none of my colleagues at their current income
levels would find boosting their income by moonlighting doing high-rise
construction work to be an attractive venture. Indeed, it is doubtful that I
could find many recruits for any blue-collar job, but the fact that these
positions are not in accord with their preferences does not mean that the
welfare of those in these positions would be enhanced if we banned all
employment in jobs that did not provide for the same safety levels that we
experience as law school professors.
As a practical matter, distinctions based on income have played a much

117. Id. at 27.
118. VISCUSI & ALDY, LABOR MARKET ESTIMATES, supra note 104, at 15-17.
119. Viscusi, Value of Risks, supra note 15, at 1942-43.
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less prominent role in regulatory contexts than in the courts. 120 The present
value of lost earnings approach yields valuations that are proportional to
income. If one recognized the positive income elasticity of VSL, then there
would be a 0.5 to 0.6 elasticity of VSL with respect to income.121
However, I know of no policy context in which there has ever been an
attempt to distinguish VSL based on income levels. Rather, the same
average VSL is applied to all benefits, with the result being that there is
implicit redistribution to those who have a lower VSL. 122
One context in which I have confronted this distributional concern is
with respect to airline safety. In my work through a consulting firm that
contracted to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), I analyzed what
VSL should be used to assess airline safety. Because airline passengers are
more affluent than the average person killed in auto crashes, I
recommended that the FAA be permitted to regulate airline safety more
stringently than highway safety, and I coupled that suggestion with a
broader recommendation that the U.S. Department of Transportation
(DOT) raise the value of life that it applies throughout the agency.123
Although my recommendation that the FAA be permitted to use a different
value of life than elsewhere in the DOT was not adopted, the DOT has
raised the value-of-life benefit figure that it uses for regulatory policy
purposes. 124
It is useful to articulate what I believe should be a general principle with
respect to the treatment of income differences. In the case of airline safety
regulations, the issue is whether the government should mandate that
airlines install particular kinds of safety equipment, such as floor lighting,
fabrics with reduced flammability, and similar improvements to aircraft
safety that passengers cannot monitor readily. 125 Federal funds are not
used to pay for these improvements, as these are simply regulatory policies

120. The present value of lost earnings by definition is proportional to income. OMB
guidelines for regulatory analysis, such as OMB, CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 16, make no
provision for income differences.
121. See Viscusi & Aldy, Statistical Life, supra note 38, at 37.
122. I have, however, been present at EPA meetings in which policymakers have argued
that EPA policies should be accorded a higher VSL for benefit assessment because the risks
are involuntary, as compared to the risks workers assume on the job.
123. The recommendation was made in a meeting I had with FAA officials and
representatives of the Office of the Secretary of Transportation. The proposed adjustments
for income level appear in the final column of Table 4 of Viscusi, Value of Risks, supra note
15, at 1930, 1932-33.
124. Table 1, infra, documents the change over time in the FAA value of life figures.
125. See John F. Morrall III, A Review of the Record, REGULATION, Nov.-Dec. 1986, at
25, 102 [hereinafter Morrall, Review of the Record].
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imposing safety requirements on airlines. 126 These costs in turn would be
transmitted to airline passengers through higher prices. Thus, because in
the airline safety case it is not the government’s money that pays for the
safety measure but rather the passengers themselves who ultimately will
bear the costs, the impetus for designing regulations that reflect the
tradeoffs passengers would likely make if they were informed about the
safety of airlines is consistent with their preferences. If airline safety
instead was being funded through general tax revenues rather than through
higher ticket prices, then the case for applying a differential value of life
would be less compelling. In the case of highway safety policies that are
broadly funded by states and the federal government, there may be an
efficiency rationale for making highways safer in Beverly Hills than in
Detroit, but because these efforts are publicly funded and not the result of a
private bargain compelled through government regulation, the equity case
for such differential values of life is not as strong.
Based on this analysis of the role of income differences, how then
should we treat the following stylized version of lifeboat access on the
Titanic? Suppose that, at the time you purchased your ticket for the
voyage, you were offered the opportunity to purchase a separate ticket to be
in a lifeboat, should an emergency arise. This kind of market situation is
unusual, as typically there are indivisibilities in the provision of safety
equipment for airplanes, as regulatory measures such as floor lighting will
benefit those in coach as well as those in first class. One would expect the
more affluent passengers to purchase those tickets because of their higher
value of statistical life. 127 These purchases would be private contracts, and
would reflect the preferences of the people who chose to purchase the
ticket or who chose to forgo such a purchase. The difficulty with this
market is that at the time of the ticket purchase, the individual is purchasing
a reduction in the small probability of death, whereas at the time the ticket
is cashed in for the ride in the lifeboat, death is a certainty for those who do
not get a lifeboat seat, as opposed to a low probability lottery. The
previous market bargains are likely to be untenable at the time the ship is
sinking.
Benefit Values Used by Government Agencies
Many government agencies utilize value-of-life estimates that are

126. Those requirements are regulatory constraints, not government expenditure
programs. See, e.g., Protective Breathing Equipment, 50 Fed. Reg. 41,452 (proposed Oct.
10, 1985) (codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 121).
127. See supra text accompanying note 123.
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usually based on my earlier inventory of the VSL studies in the
literature. 128 Table 1 provides a listing of sixteen different regulatory
analyses and the pertinent values of life used to assess these benefits.129
The VSL numbers range from a low of $1 million, used by the FAA in
1985, to a high of $6.3 million, used in many analyses performed by the
EPA. 130 Note that there has been a general increase in the valuations used
over time, as the FAA value of life number in 1996 is greater than the
number used by that agency in 1988, which in turn is greater than the
number used in 1985. 131
Although regulatory agencies are often quite diligent in calculating
benefits and in comparing benefits and costs, because of their restrictive
legislative mandates many regulations issued generate fewer benefits than
costs. 132 One measure of the cost effectiveness of regulations is the cost
per statistical life saved. 133 As the inventory prepared by John Morrall for
the OMB indicates, many regulations impose costs per life saved well in
excess of the $7 million VSL figure.134 Regulations from OSHA and the
EPA are particularly likely to be above that level, with some regulations
costing more than $100 million per expected life saved. 135 Morrall’s 2003
analysis updates his widely-cited 1986 table in which he showed that many
regulations fail such an efficacy test because of the high cost per life
saved. 136 That table included regulations that were promulgated as well as
those that had been proposed and rejected, and Morrall indicated the final
status of all entries in the table.137
In terms of the overall assessment for regulatory practice, agencies
calculate benefits, but estimated benefits are often less than the cost.138
128. See Viscusi, Value of Risks, supra note 15, at 1942-43.
129. See infra tbl.1; see also Viscusi & Aldy, Statistical Life, supra note 38, at 55.
130. See infra tbl.1.
131. See id.
132. See generally John F. Morrall III, Saving Lives: A Review of the Record, 27 J. RISK
& UNCERTAINTY 221 (2003) [hereinafter Morrall, Saving Lives].
133. See id. at 223-24 tbl.1.
134. See id.
135. See Morrall, Review of the Record, supra note 125, at 30.
136. See id. at 25-34; see also Morrall, Saving Lives, supra note 132, at 223-24 tbl.1.
137. Somewhat curiously, even though Morrall’s table included a footnote indicating
which were the regulations that had been rejected, he has been criticized for not indicating
which of the regulations in the list had been rejected. The same critics who voiced this
complaint reproduced Morrall’s table omitting the original footnote that listed which
regulations were simply proposed, which had been rejected, and which were final rules.
The reproduction of the Morrall table omitting this footnote appears in ACKERMAN &
HEINZERLING, supra note 2. Compare Morrall, Review of the Record, supra note 125, at
102, with ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 2, at 46.
138. See generally Morrall, Saving Lives, supra note 132.
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Transportation safety regulations are an exception; these regulations,
however, are not ideal because the DOT has long used a VSL figure that is
below the prevailing market estimates of VSL.139 My hypothesis is that the
agency may be suffering from an anchoring bias in that it had historically
used the present value of lost earnings figures applied in automobile
accident cases to value lives, and that subsequent changes have been
incremental.
The problem of inadequate attention to balancing benefits and costs also
pertains to other government policies that are not required to go through the
rule-making process. The cleanup of hazardous waste sites under the
Superfund program has been particularly telling in that regard.140 The
average cost expended per case of cancer averted is over $6 billion, based
on an extensive study that James T. Hamilton and I did of a very large
number of hazardous waste sites mandated for cleanup by EPA. 141 This
profligacy is due in part to the absence of any economic efficiency
requirement as well as the way in which EPA assesses risk benefits.142
Hypothetically exposed future populations receive the same weight as do
current populations exposed to the risk. The result is that cleanups often
target areas where there are very few people actually at risk, thus diverting
resources from sites where real risks to existing populations could be
reduced. 143 Thus, sites with low risk reduction benefits are treated the
same as sites where benefits would be greater if they were estimated
properly. 144
What Hamilton and I have shown is that the cost per case of cancer
prevented is much lower at sites in which a large segment of the exposed
Thus, targeting
population consists of lower-income minorities. 145
cleanups based on cost effectiveness from an economic standpoint would
help the poor, as compared to the current cleanup strategy. 146 Thus, the
claim that there is a tradeoff between efficiency and equity in this instance
is a false characterization of the policy problem, as greater attention to
efficiency enhances environmental equity. 147

139. See infra tbl.1.
140. See JAMES T. HAMILTON & W. KIP VISCUSI, CALCULATING RISKS? THE SPATIAL AND
POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF HAZARDOUS WASTE POLICY 109-10 (1999).
141. See id. at 125.
142. Id. at 25-57
143. Id. at 56-57
144. Id.
145. Id. at 182.
146. Id. at 176-86.
147. Id. at 188.
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Stated Preference Approaches 148
In situations in which market data are not readily available, economists
have frequently used contingent valuation or stated preference models to
elicit people’s willingness to pay for various risk and environmental
outcomes. 149 These survey techniques have addressed a wide variety of
outcomes. Among the health outcomes that have been valued are the
saving of lives of post-heart attack victims, reduction of airline fatalities,
throat congestion, headaches, bleach poisonings, skin poisonings, toilet
bowl cleaner gassings, child poisonings, nerve disease, nonfatal lymphoma,
and severe chronic bronchitis.150
These survey methods achieved substantial prominence with respect to
the Exxon Valdez oil spill. To assess natural resource damages,
economists on behalf of the state of Alaska and on behalf of the U.S.
Department of Justice ran surveys to determine the value that people place
on such oil spills. 151 I was a consultant and expert witness for the U.S.
Department of Justice and National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration team.
These methodologies have aroused considerable controversy, stimulated
in large part by the substantial stakes of the Exxon Valdez litigation.152

148. For discussion of some stated preference methods, the widespread use of stated
preference approaches in the federal government, and criteria for sound stated preference
studies, see OMB, CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 16, at 22-24.
149. See, e.g., Peter A. Diamond & Jerry A. Hausman, Contingent Valuation: Is Some
Number Better Than No Number?, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1994, at 45.
150. A review of these health-related studies appears in Viscusi, Value of Risks, supra
note 15, at 1940-41. For a wide range of EPA studies of these and other related benefits
matters, see National Center for Environmental Economics, U.S. Environmental Protection
STUDIES]
Agency,
Publications,
[hereinafter
EPA
http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eed.nsf/webpages/Publications.html. For an example of
EPA’s use of my chronic bronchitis research, see ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE BENEFITS AND
COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 1990 TO 2010, at H-15 (1999), (“[T]he valuation of chronic
bronchitis is based on the distribution of WTP responses from Viscusi et al. (1991).”) (citing
W. Kip Viscusi, Wesley A. Magat & Joel Huber, Pricing Environmental Health Risks:
Survey Assessments of Risk-Risk and Risk-Dollar Trade-Offs for Chronic Bronchitis, 21 J.
ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 32 (1991) [hereinafter Viscusi et al., Environmental Health Risks])
available at http://www.epa.gov/air/sect812/1990-2010/fullrept.pdf. The chronic bronchitis
analysis makes an adjustment to willingness to pay to account for the less severe nature of
the chronic bronchitis cases reduced by the Clean Air Act. This value has become the
standard chronic bronchitis valuation figure for air rules related to particulate matter.
151. See VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION, supra note 33, at 780. For the
original report on the State of Alaska analysis of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, see RICHARD T.
CARSON ET AL., A CONTINGENT VALUATION STUDY OF LOST PASSIVE USE VALUES
RESULTING
FROM
THE
EXXON
VALDEZ
OIL
SPILL
(1992),
http://www.rff.org/~kopp/Reports/contingentvaluation.pdf.
152. See Diamond & Hausman, supra note 149, at 51 n.10.
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Economists funded by Exxon criticized the contingent valuation approach
because survey estimates did not satisfy basic principles of rationality.153
Thus, for example, people should be willing to pay more to save 10,000
birds than to save 100 birds, whereas surveys suggested that people were
not responsive to the scope of the commodity being saved. 154 Somewhat
surprisingly, left-wing critics of the stated preference methodology, such as
Ackerman and Heinzerling, have allied themselves with these corporate
critiques and expressed a substantial skepticism of the use of such survey
methods. 155 Presumably these same critics who opposed the use of stated
preference methods for regulatory analysis would not also have opposed
the use of survey techniques to determine the natural resource damages
caused by the Exxon Valdez oil spill if survey methods were the only
means for developing such an estimate.
Since the time of the Exxon Valdez oil spill debate, there has been
considerable progress in the development of survey methodologies, and
these developments make it possible to overcome the earlier shortcomings.
OMB, for example, has outlined the criteria that such stated preference
methods should satisfy in order to develop credible estimates.156 These
guidelines include accurate characterization of the good being purchased by
the respondent, and a credible payment mechanism. 157
For the past eight years, Joel Huber and I have been developing survey
techniques to value what the benefit to the country is of clean lakes, rivers,
and streams. Using a nationally representative sample of thousands of
respondents, we found that people were able to give quite consistent
answers that passed a wide variety of rationality tests. 158 Unlike the 100
birds being equivalent to 10,000 birds phenomenon found in the surveys
from over a decade ago, our survey structure yielded results in which more
environmental quality was consistently preferred to less.159 Similarly,

153. See id. at 51 n.10, 52-53.
154. See, e.g., id. at 51-52; see also William H. Desvousges et al., Measuring Natural
Resource Damages with Contingent Valuation: Tests of Validity and Reliability, in
CONTINGENT VALUATION: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 91 (Jerry A. Hausman ed., 1993).
155. See ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 2, at 94-98. For a recent response to the
Ackerman and Heinzerling critique, see the article by EPA senior economist Alan Carlin,
The New Challenge to Cost-Benefit Analysis, REGULATION, Fall 2005, at 18, 20.
156. OMB, CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 16, at 22-23.
157. For more discussion of these criteria, see id. at 23.
158. W. KIP VISCUSI & JOEL HUBER, HYPERBOLIC DISCOUNTING OF PUBLIC GOODS 8
(2005), http://www.aeaweb.org/annual_mtg_papers/2006/0107_1015_1103.pdf.
159. See generally W. Kip Viscusi, Joel Huber & Jason Bell, The Value of Regional
Water Quality Improvements (John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus., Harvard Law Sch.,
Faculty Discussion Paper Series No. 477, 2004) [hereinafter Viscusi et al., Water Quality
Improvements],
available
at
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lower costs for environmental improvement were consistently preferred to
higher costs. 160 Responses to the survey also passed complicated
dominance tests, as subjects preferred alternatives on two dimensions that
were dominant choices from an economic standpoint.161
In addition to passing these various rationality tests, the study also met
OMB’s criteria for sound survey design, and OMB approved every pretest
and final field version of the survey. The survey text defined the
commodity to be valued—improvements in water quality—in great detail
so that respondents would understand the good. The payment mechanism
of higher cost of living after moving to a new region was also well
understood and was a credible payment vehicle.
The survey methodology we used was a series of iterative choices that
parallels the approach we used in other studies, such as the chronic
bronchitis analysis that has been used for benefit assessment purposes by
the EPA. 162 Since there seems to be some misunderstanding on the part of
people such as Ackerman and Heinzerling as to how the interview structure
works, it is worthwhile to elaborate a bit on the survey methodology.163
Figure 1 provides a sample water quality benefit valuation question.164
FIGURE 1. SAMPLE PRIVATE WATER QUALITY BENEFIT QUESTION
We would like to ask you some more questions like these. In these
questions, however, one region will have a lower annual cost of living and
the other will have higher water quality. REMEMBER THAT THE NATIONAL
AVERAGE FOR WATER QUALITY IS 65% GOOD.

Increase in

Region 1

Region 2

$100

$300

http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/477.pdf.
160. See id.
161. An example of a dominated alternative is that a policy improvement of fifteen
percent in water quality for $200 is dominated by an improvement of twenty percent for
$200. Rational respondents should prefer a twenty percent improvement to a fifteen percent
improvement if they are both equally costly.
162. See generally Viscusi et al., Environmental Health Risks, supra note 150.
163. In particular, they claim that only two-thirds of the respondents were able to
understand the interview. See ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 2, at 96. The onethird figure includes people who were not only inconsistent but also includes people who hit
the corners of the iterative choice decision structure, and consequently does not reflect
people who did not understand the interview structure. See id.
164. See infra fig.1; see also VISCUSI & HUBER, supra note 158, at 33.
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Annual Cost
Of Living

More
Expensive

More
Expensive

Percent of Lake
Acres and River
Miles With
Good
Water Quality

40%
Good
Water
Quality

60%
Good
Water
Quality

Which Region
Would you
Prefer?

Region 1
*

Region 2
*
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No Preference
*

The individual has a choice between two regions, as region 2 offers a
greater level of water quality that is rated good but at an annual cost of
living of an additional $200. 165 Respondents who did not express
indifference to a first choice such as this considered a series of four
subsequent choices, including a final dominated choice. Individuals who
failed to pass the dominance test were labeled “inconsistent,” and people
who hit the corners of the valuation task tree were not achieving
indifference and had implied values that would be estimated statistically.
Only five percent of the respondents gave inconsistent responses to the
series of iterative choice questions that forced respondents to consider
tradeoffs between cost of living and water quality in pairwise regional
choices. 166 Based on the initial choice, respondents’ valuations are
bounded from above or below depending on whether they pick the high
cost of living-higher water quality region or the low cost of living-lower
water quality region. Respondents are then given a series of iterative
choices to refine their answers further. Of these, eventually 3,254 of our
respondents reached a point of indifference regarding the choices presented
to them, while 403 respondents continued to prefer the high water quality
option, and 346 continued to prefer the lower cost of living option. The
fact that there are 749 respondents who are at the corners of this sequential
decision choice does not imply that they did not understand the interview,
or that the methodology was unsuccessful. Using two-limit Tobit
estimates, it is feasible to estimate what their responses would have been
had the iterative choice process continued indefinitely; the procedure

165. See supra fig.1.
166. The results below are based on unpublished computer runs for our ongoing analysis
of water quality benefits for the EPA.
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estimates the value of water quality for the sample by, in effect, taking into
account what the responses would be had they not hit the upper limit in the
survey structure. Quite interestingly, these Tobit results were quite stable
across the various iterations, implying mean valuations of $31 for each unit
increase in water quality improvement in a 90-mile radius of one’s home
region.
EPA and other agencies continue to rely on stated preference
methodologies because benefit assessment is quite central to the policy
valuation process. 167 In a world of limited resources, eventually tradeoffs
must be made, and the monetization of these benefits serves to put these
quite disparate commodities in comparable terms.
What Should Get Monetized? Real Versus Imaginary Benefits
An interesting policy problem stimulated in part by a question posed by
Paul Portney is the weight that people should place on real benefits as
opposed to imaginary benefits. 168 Consider the following variant on his
Happyville problem. Suppose that there are two risks facing a population.
The first chemical exposure actually imposes negligible cancer risk, but
people believe the risk to be one in 1000. The second chemical actually
does pose a risk, and people accurately assess this risk as being one in
10,000. Because the population in this town is 10,000, people believe that
the expected number of deaths that could be prevented by addressing the
first risk is ten, where in fact it is zero, while the expected number of deaths
from the second chemical is one. If the cost of cleanup is identical for both
chemicals and there are only sufficient funds to clean up one of these two
chemicals, recognition of the primary role of citizen sovereignty would
clearly lead to addressing the imaginary risk from chemical one and
ignoring the real risk from chemical two.
The broader question raised by this example for benefits assessment is
the extent to which the government should monetize imaginary risks as
opposed to real risks. The fact that people have irrational fears does not
seem to warrant the calculation of any health benefit, although there might
be some small benefit in terms of anxiety reduction that might be better
addressed through an informational campaign rather than squandering
resources. The principle I will advocate here is that monetization of
benefits should be restricted to placing dollar values on the estimates of the
expected number of lives saved based on scientific evidence rather than on

167. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
168. For Portney’s conjecture, see Paul R. Portney, Trouble in Happyville, 11 J. POL’Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 131, 131-32 (1992).
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public perceptions. For the same kinds of reasons that we would not want
to ignore risks that are not known to the public, such as the hidden dangers
of occupational carcinogens, we would also not want to misallocate
resources by addressing risks that the public believes to be greater than is
actually the case.
In some instances, government agencies may foster excessive emphasis
on these imaginary risks. As noted above, by focusing on risks to
hypothetical future populations, the EPA often places undue emphasis on
imaginary risks that will never come to pass. 169 Justice Stephen Breyer
recounts an example of a case in his court in which a Superfund site was
clean enough for children to play on the site and eat small amounts of dirt
for seventy days a year, but after that site was cleaned up, children would
be able to eat the dirt for 245 days per year.170 Justice Breyer was puzzled
because “there were no dirt-eating children playing in the area, for it was a
swamp. Nor were dirt-eating children likely to appear there, for future
building seemed unlikely.” 171 This excessive focus on imaginary risks
rather than real risks distorts our priorities and actually has a perverse
distribution effect.
Risk-Risk Analysis
When monetizing the benefits of government policies, it is essential to
monetize the net health and safety benefits, not the gross benefits. There
may be a variety of benefit offsets, such as decreased consumer precautions
in the presence of safety caps, which I termed the “lulling effect.” 172 There
also could be ancillary safety benefits, as hypothesized by Rascoff and
Revesz. 173
The focus here will be on the concept of risk-risk analysis in the sense of
health-risk increases that result from the opportunity costs of policy
expenditures. The underlying principle is that being richer is healthier, as
there is a positive income elasticity of health and safety levels.174 Judge

169. See id.
170. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION 12 (1993).
171. Id.
172. See, for example, my discussion in VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS, supra note 45, at 12,
224-27.
173. See generally Samuel J. Rascoff & Richard L. Revesz, The Biases of Risk Tradeoff
Analysis: Towards Parity in Environmental and Health-and-Safety Regulation, 69 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1763 (2002).
174. The first documentation of this relationship in the professional literature is W. Kip
Viscusi, Wealth Effects and Earnings Premiums for Job Hazards, 60 REV. ECON. & STAT.
408 (1978).
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Stephen Williams brought the risk-risk concept to the forefront of the
policy debate, when he observed that very expensive OSHA regulations
could lead to a net decrease in safety. 175 The rationale is that very high
levels of expenditure represent an opportunity cost and take money away
from consumers that could otherwise be used for health-enhancing
expenditures, such as health care, safer products, and safer
neighborhoods. 176 Although Judge Williams focused on existing published
estimates that indicated that expenditures of under $10 million per life
saved could be counterproductive, low estimates appear to be implausible,
since it is unlikely that expenditures comparable to the value of statistical
life could reduce safety levels.177 On a theoretical basis there should be a
linkage between the value of life from the standpoint of prevention and the
level of expenditure that leads to the loss of a statistical life.178 In
particular, I showed that the marginal expenditure per statistical life lost
equals the VSL divided by the marginal propensity to spend on health from
one’s income. 179 If we focus only on health-enhancing expenditures, then
the marginal propensity to spend on health is approximately 0.1, so that the
level of expenditure that will lead to the loss of a statistical life is $70
million if the value of life is $7 million.180 Higher levels of expenditure
may also lead to consumption that harms oneself. 181 Recognizing these
influences leads to a lower estimate of the expenditure level per life saved
that would be counterproductive. 182
A set of examples in Table 2 illustrates that recognition of risk-risk
tradeoffs affects the estimates of benefits. 183 For that series of regulations,
the authors calculate the net lives saved by regulations, taking into account
the risk-risk tradeoffs. 184 To monetize the benefits of these regulations,
175. See Int’l Union, UAW v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310, 1326-27 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(Williams, J., concurring).
176. See id.
177. For an example of the kind of risk-risk analysis cited by Judge Williams, see Ralph
L. Keeney, Mortality Risks Induced by Economic Expenditures, 10 RISK ANALYSIS 147
(1990).
178. See Randall Lutter, John F. Morrall III & W. Kip Viscusi, The Cost-Per-Life-Saved
Cutoff for Safety-Enhancing Regulations, 37 ECON. INQUIRY 599, 605 (1999).
179. See id.
180. See id. Using an estimated VSL of $5 million, that article concluded that an
expenditure of $15 million will lead to the loss of a statistical life. Use of a $7 million VSL
figure rather than a $5 million figure will increase that estimate proportionately.
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. See infra tbl.2; see also ROBERT W. HAHN, RANDALL W. LUTTER & W. KIP VISCUSI,
DO FEDERAL REGULATIONS REDUCE MORTALITY? 16-17 (2000) [hereinafter HAHN ET AL.,
REDUCE MORTALITY].
184. See HAHN ET AL., REDUCE MORTALITY, supra note 183, at 16-17.

VISCUSI_CHRISTENSEN

2006]

2/3/2011 10:25 PM

MONETIZING THE BENEFITS OF RISK

131

one could then apply the VSL of $7 million to the net lives saved figure,
which will produce an estimate of the net monetary safety benefits resulting
from the regulation. As indicated in the table, many of these health and
safety regulations are counterproductive in terms of their net effects on
health and safety. 185
Although the “richer is safer” argument may appear to be
counterintuitive, the following example shows the mechanisms at work.
Suppose that regulatory policy was no more productive than paying people
to dig ditches and fill them back up again. This level of efficacy is not too
far removed from many of the most inefficient regulations. By diverting
consumer expenditures through taxes, higher prices, or lower wages from
the usual bundle of consumption goods, such a ditch-digging policy will
impose net health costs through the opportunity costs of the money being
expended.
Ackerman and Heinzerling criticize this risk-risk approach and express
puzzlement that advocates of the risk-risk methodology have never
suggested applying this methodology to other types of expenditure, such as
military spending. 186 The genesis of the risk-risk methodology in policy
contexts stems from the fact that regulatory agencies such as OSHA and
EPA have a myopic risk-oriented approach. 187 Unlike other government
policies, risk regulation costs do not come out of general revenues, so there
are no internal budgetary restrictions.188 If cost does not enter policy
evaluations on equal footing with benefits, or possibly not count at all
because of agencies’ restrictive legislative mandates, then in the extreme
case the only scorecard component that matters is how a regulation
performs from a risk standpoint. What the risk-risk methodology points
out is that even if all we are about is health and safety with cost as a matter
of complete indifference, truly wasteful expenditures on regulations are
still not advancing that objective. Thus, it provides a way to open the
policy debate to evaluate truly ineffective policies in situations in which
only risk effects seem to be of concern to policymakers.
To the best of my knowledge, a purely health-and-safety scorecard is not
used outside of the risk and environmental regulation arena. If, however,
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services were to fund

185. Id. at 19.
186. See ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 2, at 59.
187. In some instances, costs cannot be considered at all. See VISCUSI, FATAL
TRADEOFFS, supra note 45, at 261.
188. As a result there have been proposals that agencies be subject to a regulatory budget,
as discussed in W. KIP VISCUSI, RISK BY CHOICE: REGULATING HEALTH AND SAFETY IN THE
WORKPLACE 152-55 (1983).
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healthcare programs that saved statistical lives at a cost of $100 million per
life, then the same type of argument regarding the counterproductive nature
of such expenditures would be pertinent. Exorbitant expenditures on health
and safety do not have a net beneficial effect on health.
Monetizing Benefits for Policy
A substantial dividend from the monetization of the benefits from risk
and environmental regulation is that doing so has placed these benefits on
equal footing with the quite tangible costs of these regulations. These
benefits no longer are subsidiary qualitative considerations. 189 The
importance of valuing benefits and the extent to which placing such
benefits on an equitable basis with costs is apparent based on the history of
regulatory oversight of new government regulations.190
The original regulatory oversight process was only concerned with costs,
not benefits. 191 Costs were tangible monetary losses, while benefits were
seemingly nebulous and more abstract environmental amenities.192 The
Nixon administration initiated informal “quality of life” reviews that
focused on the cost of impact regulations on the economy. 193 The Ford
administration formalized this process through Executive Order 11,821,
which required agencies to prepare inflationary impact analyses of the costs
of these regulations. 194 Once again, all that mattered were the monetized
costs, not the benefits, even though these also potentially could be
translated into monetary terms. 195
The Carter administration regulatory oversight effort of Executive Order
12,044 expanded the requirements to include cost-effectiveness tests.196
The agency had to show that it was achieving the particular benefits of the
regulation for the least possible cost.197 As with the Ford administration

189. RICHARD L. BERKMAN & W. KIP VISCUSI, DAMMING THE WEST: RALPH NADER’S
STUDY GROUP REPORT ON THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION 75 (1973).
190. The documentation of the history based on the discussion below appears in VISCUSI
ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION, supra note 33, at 24-33.
191. See id. at 24.
192. This observation is based on my experience in supervising all new major federal
regulation from 1979-1980 as Deputy Director of the President’s Council on Wage and
Price Stability.
193. VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION, supra note 33, at 24.
194. Exec. Order No. 11,821, 39 Fed. Reg. 41,501 (Nov. 29, 1974); see also VISCUSI ET
AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION, supra note 33, at 24.
195. See VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION, supra note 33, at 24.
196. Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661 (Mar. 23, 1978); see also VISCUSI ET
AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION, supra note 33, at 25.
197. VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION, supra note 33, at 25.
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program, this regulatory effort was run by the White House Council on
Wage and Price Stability, for which I was the Deputy Director. The main
focus remained on costs and inflationary impact of regulation, though the
concerns were expanded to include cost effectiveness. Perhaps because of
this emphasis, the kinds of monetization that are the focus of my paper
were not yet undertaken by regulatory agencies. For example, agencies did
not use VSL to value the benefits of regulatory efforts or undertake stated
preference surveys to determine the value of environmental amenities.
Once the Reagan administration required that agencies demonstrate that
the benefits of regulation exceeded the costs, agencies could either quantify
the cost effects in monetary terms and compare them to the risk and
environmental benefits described in a qualitative manner, or they could
explore more innovative approaches to try to capture the extent to which
there were real and tangible benefits from these regulatory efforts.198 As I
indicated in my discussion of the OSHA hazard communication regulation,
OSHA began using my value-of-life estimates beginning in 1982, in part
because this methodology greatly enhanced the attractiveness of regulatory
policies, given the substantial benefits this economic approach accorded to
reducing risks to human life. 199 Perhaps for much the same reason, the
EPA has been at the forefront of developing and funding research efforts to
place a dollar value on environmental amenities, ranging from improved
visibility of the Grand Canyon to the value that improvements of water
quality will have to people who do not even use bodies of water for fishing,
swimming, or other recreational purposes.200
The development of new techniques for monetizing benefits has led to
new controversies, both because the empirical methods themselves remain
in the process of development, and because there has been an effort to
extend and refine the estimates in a variety of ways. 201 In the case of
valuing statistical lives, use of these numbers is no longer regarded as
controversial by regulatory agencies, as their application in benefit
assessments has become routine. The issues that are now at the forefront of
the policy agenda involve refinements in how such values can be applied.
Most notably, the debate over whether there should be a senior discount for
the value placed on the lives of the elderly for the Clear Skies Initiative
exemplifies the extent to which there are clearly contentious issues arising

198. See id. at 27.
199. As discussed above, these value-of-life estimates led to an OSHA regulation being
assessed as having benefits in excess of costs, whereas the earlier approach led to the
opposite conclusion. See supra notes 89-96 and accompanying text.
200. See EPA STUDIES, supra note 150.
201. See Carlin, supra note 155, at 20.
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from the application of different values for different segments of the
population. 202 My past work indicates that the magnitude of age
differences in VSL is not that substantial, and that the policy debate should
not become mired in such subsidiary controversies. 203 The more
fundamental challenge is to strike a reasonable overall balance between
cost and risk. 204 Engaging in more contentious debates regarding the
differences in the value of life across segments of the population seems
premature given that more fundamental lack of benefit-cost balance in
regulatory policies.205
A substantial dividend from the monetization of risk and environmental
regulatory impacts is that this process links these benefits to the
fundamental economic determinants of benefit values, which is the
willingness to pay of those affected by a regulation for the effects of these
policies. 206 In the case of VSL, these estimates are typically derived from
the preferences that workers reveal through their risky job choices and the
wage premiums they receive for risk. 207 In the case of other environmental
benefits, the main focus has been on a variety of stated preference
approaches that elicit measures of the willingness to pay for the
environmental benefit.208 By their very nature, the valuations derived from
market evidence will reflect preferences of the citizenry.
The advent of stated preference methods has in turn created new
components of benefits that could substantially loom large in the benefit
assessment process. Perhaps the most controversial benefit component is
that of nonuse or passive use of an environmental resource.209 Historically,
economists valued the use of improved environmental resources through
the recreational value of, or the travel costs that people incurred to visit the
environmental site. The use of stated preference approaches has greatly
expanded the scope of such benefits to include the value of benefits to

202. See Christine Todd Whitman, Adm’r, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Statement at the
Aging Initiative Public Listening Session (May 7, 2003) (renouncing the senior discount),
http://www.epa.gov/aging/listening/2003/balt_ctw.htm.
203. VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS, supra note 45, at 30.
204. See id. at 31-32.
205. See id.
206. Id. at 17.
207. Id. at 42-49.
208. See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE
FINAL REGIONAL HAZE RULE, at ES-3, http://www.epa.gov/ttncaaa1/t1ria.html (follow
“Executive Summary” hyperlink).
209. See Richard T. Carson et al., Was the NOAA Panel Correct About Contingent
Valuation? (Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper No. 96-20, 1996), available at
http://www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-DP-96-20.pdf.
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people who do not even directly use the environmental amenity. 210 Thus,
in the case of water quality benefits, people who do not fish, visit
recreational areas, or picnic at these rivers or lakes may nevertheless
express fairly substantial values for improvements in water quality in their
region as well as elsewhere in the country. 211 Nonuse benefits are
legitimate but often difficult to measure, making this benefit category a
prime target of critics of regulatory policies.212 As with market-based
estimates, these elicited values will reflect the willingness to pay of the
citizenry. 213 The scope of the benefits that can be captured through the
monetization of environmental benefits is quite broad and is not limited to
the kinds of activities for which one normally conceives that a market
arrangement might be appropriate. 214
Put somewhat differently, any regulatory benefit from a risk regulation
or environmental regulation that should be legitimately recognized in the
policy analysis process can potentially be quantified in monetary terms.
Doing so will enable these benefits to reflect the values of the people who
are affected by the regulation rather than the preferences of policymakers
who would otherwise seek to impose their own values on the citizenry.
My support for the monetization of environmental benefits began over
three decades ago with my involvement as co-author of a Nader study
group study analyzing the dam building efforts of the U.S. Department of
Interior’s Bureau of Reclamation. 215 That agency could only undertake
policies for which the benefits exceeded the costs. Quantified benefits such
as irrigation and electric power were tallied, but environmental
consequences were not, with the result being that they were largely
ignored. As our report concluded:
Why shouldn’t environmental consequences of Reclamation projects also
be given dollar values? Without such consideration, “tangible benefits”
such as irrigation or power overshadow ecological effects. For example,
in the 1960s the Bureau of Reclamation wanted to flood major portions of
210. See, e.g., Viscusi et al., Water Quality Improvements, supra note 159, at 12 (noting
that nonusers are permitted to value water quality, but people who visit lakes and rivers have
a higher value).
211. Users have a twenty-eight percent higher value. Id.
212. SUSAN E. DUDLEY & BRIAN F. MANNIX, MERCATUS CTR., GEORGE MASON UNIV.,
PUBLIC INTEREST COMMENT ON THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET’S DRAFT
GUIDELINES FOR THE CONDUCT OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS AND THE FORMAT OF
ACCOUNTING STATEMENTS 10-13 (2003), https://www.mercatus.org/pdf/materials/314.pdf
213. If the survey sample consists of populations reflective of the preferences of those
affected by the policy, this will be true.
214. For example, valuation of water quality in Viscusi et al., Water Quality
Improvements, supra note 159, does not deal with water being sold.
215. See BERKMAN & VISCUSI, supra note 189.
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the Grand Canyon by building Bridge Canyon and Marble Canyon dams
on the Colorado. As usual, the Bureau paid lip service to environmental
considerations in the narrative section of its project reports. However,
when it came to placing dollar values on project effects, environmental
impacts weren’t mentioned at all and played no part in the benefit-cost
evaluation. Consequently, the Bureau of Reclamation added up the
“tangible” benefits and costs of its projects, found that the dollar value of
benefits exceeded the estimated costs, concluded that the projects were
economically justified, and sent them on to Congress. 216

How, then, did the efforts to dam up the Grand Canyon get stopped?
Economist Dr. Alan Carlin, who is now a senior economist at the EPA,
showed with a co-author that the quantified benefits in fact did not exceed
the costs. 217 His analysis, however, turned not on adverse environmental
effects, which were not readily monetized in that era of economic analysis,
but on the overestimation of electric power benefits. It may be that Dr.
Carlin’s misgivings about the Priceless approach, 218 as well as my own
resistance to the Priceless point of view, stems in part from our longer
historical perspective. The government has already run the experiment of
analyzing proposed programs with major environmental effects but not
monetizing the environmental consequences. The result was not that these
effects were treated as being “priceless,” but instead were viewed as being
worthless.
CONCLUSION
The Priceless approach consequently has taken us full circle. In the
early era of policy analyses, there were efforts to quantify benefit
components for goods traded in markets, but risk and environmental
consequences were not monetized. The result was that monetized benefits
took precedence. After President Reagan required that new regulations
pass a test that benefits exceed costs, the efforts to monetize risk and
environmental effects expanded, often accompanied by the development of
new methodologies to ascertain society’s willingness to pay for risk and
environmental benefits. Efforts to quantify benefit components such as
nonuse values for the environment have long been opposed by industry
groups who are defendants in natural resource damages cases in which the
values are being used to assess damages. Consideration of nonuse values
has also been opposed by conservative critics who are fearful that these
assessments will lead to overly ambitious policies. The advocates of the
216. Id. at 75.
217. See id. at 75-76, 91.
218. For Dr. Carlin’s views, see Carlin, supra note 155.
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Priceless approach have joined forces with these groups, but from the
opposite perspective, arguing that no finite monetary value is appropriate.
Each of these anti-monetization schools of thought loses sight of the
overriding purpose of policy assessment. The benefit valuation task
remains that of determining society’s willingness to pay for the policy.
Monetization of benefits remains the soundest approach for doing so in a
manner that will give these effects standing in the regulatory policy
process.
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TABLE 1. VALUES OF STATISTICAL LIFE USED BY U.S. REGULATORY
AGENCIES, 1985-2000 219
Value of a
Statistical Life

Year

Agency

Regulation

1985

Federal Aviation

Protective Breathing Equipment (50 Fed. Reg. 41,452)

$1.0

Environmental

Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives; Gasoline Lead

$1.7

Protection Agency

Content (50 Fed. Reg. 9,400)

Federal Aviation

Improved Survival Equipment for Inadvertent Water

Administration

Landings (53 Fed. Reg. 24,890)

Environmental

Protection of Stratospheric Ozone (53 Fed. Reg.

Protection Agency

30,566)

(millions,
2000 $)

Administration
1985

1988

1988

1990

1994

1995

1996

Federal Aviation

Proposed Establishment of the Harlingen Airport Radar

Administration

Service Area, TX (55 Fed. Reg. 32,064)

Food and Nutrition

National School Lunch Program and School Breakfast

Service (USDA)

Program (59 Fed. Reg. 30,218)

Consumer Product

Multiple Tube Mine and Shell Fireworks Devices (60

Safety Commission

Fed. Reg. 34,922)

Food Safety

Pathogen Reduction; Hazard Analysis and Critical

Inspection Service

Control Point Systems (61 Fed. Reg. 38,806)

$1.5

$4.8

$2.0

$1.7, $3.5

$5.6

$1.9

(USDA)
1996

Food and Drug

Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of

Administration

Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children

$2.7

and Adolescents (61 Fed. Reg. 44,396)
1996

Federal Aviation

Aircraft Flight Simulator Use in Pilot Training,

Administration

Testing, and Checking and at Training Centers (61 Fed.

$3.0

Reg. 34,508)
1996

Environmental

Requirements for Lead-Based Paint Activities in

Protection Agency

Target Housing and Child-Occupied Facilities (61 Fed.

$6.3

Reg. 45,778)
1996

Food and Drug

Medical

Devices;

Current

Good

Administration

Practice Final Rule; Quality System Regulation (61
Fed. Reg. 52,602)

219. Viscusi & Aldy, Statistical Life, supra note 38, at 55.

Manufacturing

$5.5

VISCUSI_CHRISTENSEN

2006]
1997

1999

1999

2/3/2011 10:25 PM

MONETIZING THE BENEFITS OF RISK
Environmental

National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone (62

Protection Agency

Fed. Reg. 38,856)

Environmental

Radon in Drinking Water Health Risk Reduction and

Protection Agency

Cost Analysis (64 Fed. Reg. 9,560)

Environmental

Control of Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicles:

Protection Agency

Tier 2 Motor Vehicle Emissions Standards and

139
$6.3

$6.3

$3.9, $6.3

Gasoline Sulfur Control Requirements (65 Fed. Reg.
6,698)
2000

Consumer Product

Portable Bed Rails; Advance Notice of Proposed

Safety Commission

Rulemaking (65 Fed. Reg. 58,968)

$5.0
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TABLE 2. EVALUATION OF RISK-RISK TRADEOFF FOR TWENTY-FOUR
U.S. REGULATIONS, 1986–1998 220
Discounted
Regulation

Year

Agency Statistical Lives
Saved

Toxicity characteristics to determine

Fatalities Induced by Net Lives Saved
Cost of Regulations by Regulations

1990

EPA

0.048

-23

23

1988

EPA

1.1

-22

24

1994

HUD

1.5

-3.2

4.7

1992

DOL

220

-42

260

1996

HHS

4,700

-140

4,900

1998

HHS

710

9.2

700

Quality mammography standards

1997

HHS

75

1.4

74

Food labeling regulations

1993

HHS

520

10

510

Childproof lighters

1993

CPSC

95

2.9

92

Standard for occupational exposure to

1987

DOL

4.4

1.8

2.6

1997

DOL

12

5.9

6.2

1992

DOL

0.7

0.71

-0.01

hazardous wastes
Underground storage tanks: technical
requirements
Manufactured home construction and
safety standards on wind standards
Process safety management of highly
hazardous chemicals
Regulations restricting the sale and
distribution of cigarettes and smokeless
tobacco to protect children and
adolescents
Medicare and Medicaid programs:
hospital conditions of participation;
identification of potential organ, tissue,
and eye donors; and transplant hospitals’
provision of transplant-related data

benzene
Occupational exposure to methylene
chloride
Occupational exposure to 4,4’
methylenedianiline

220. HAHN ET AL., REDUCE MORTALITY, supra note 183, at 16-17.
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Discounted

Regulation

Year

Agency Statistical Lives
Saved

Asbestos: manufacture, importation,

141

Fatalities Induced by Net Lives Saved
Cost of Regulations by Regulations

1989

EPA

3.9

4.3

-0.41

1991

EPA

44

63

-19

Occupational exposure to asbestos

1994

DOL

13

20

-7.1

Hazardous waste management system—

1990

EPA

0.29

0.83

-0.55

1993

EPA

0.24

2.6

-2.3

1990

EPA

2.8

30

-27

1986

EPA

1

12

-11

Occupational exposure to formaldehyde

1987

DOL

0.21

4.8

-4.5

Prohibit the land disposal of the first third

1988

EPA

2.9

66

-63

1994

EPA

0.16

8.3

-8.2

1992

EPA

0.0061

3.4

-3.4

processing, and distribution in
commerce—prohibitions (total)
National primary and secondary water
regulations—phase II: maximum
contaminant levels for 38 contaminants

wood preservatives
Sewage sludge use and disposal
regulations, 40 C.F.R. pt. 503
Land disposal restrictions for “third third”
scheduled wastes
Hazardous waste management system:
final solvents and dioxins land disposal
restrictions rule

of scheduled wastes (“second sixth”
proposal)
Land disposal restrictions—phase II:
universal treatment standards and
treatment standards for organic toxicity,
characteristic wastes, and newly listed
wastes
Drinking water regulations, synthetic
organic chemicals—phase V
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Discounted

Regulation

Year

Agency Statistical Lives
Saved

Solid waste disposal facility criteria, 40
C.F.R. pt. 257 & pt. 258

1991

EPA

0.0049

[Vol. XXXIII

Fatalities Induced by Net Lives Saved
Cost of Regulations by Regulations
10

-10
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